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Abstract
This paper explores the sources of retirement synchronization in dual career
households. Empirical evidence suggests that majority of the couples exit the labor
force within a short period of time, too tight to be explained by the age differences
alone. This retirement coordination is frequently attributed to the complementar-
ity of the spouses’ leisure. Contrary to this view, my estimates suggest that in a
household with CES preferences the quantities of leisure consumed by husbands
and wives are gross substitutes. Looking for alternative explanations, I develop
a dynamic programming model of optimal retirement and labor supply decisions
with uncertainty about the household structure, survival, future health status and
income. Apart from leisure complementarity, four other channels may generate
coordinated retirement in the model: health shocks, the household structure, cor-
related tastes for leisure due to sorting on unobservables, and spousal benefits
provided by the Social Security. Using a set of counterfactuals, I show that un-
observed heterogeneity of the household tastes for leisure is the most important
source of retirement coordination in the model.
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 1 Introduction
An empirical regularity observed in many datasets is that spouses tend to coordinate the
timing of retirement from the labor force. Examples of papers that document this fact
are Blau (1998) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2000). According to Blau, the likelihood
of wife (husband) leaving the labor force is 63% (53%) higher when the spouse is unem-
ployed. Up to 15% of the married couples exit the labor force in the same quarter, and
in almost 40% of the cases the retirement dates of the two spouses are within one year.
This is much closer timing than the age differences between the spouses can justify.
One explanation for retirement coordination advanced in the literature is comple-
mentarity between the leisure of husband and wife discussed first by Kniesner (1976).
According to this view, older spouses terminate their careers around the same time be-
cause the leisure after retirement is enjoyed more when spent together. This paper is
the first to suggest a formal test of leisure complementarity that appeals directly to the
definition of the elasticity of substitution. Degree of complementarity between two in-
puts in production theory is commonly tested under assumption of constant elasticity of
substitution technology. I apply the same technique in this paper to test whether the
leisure time of husband and wive is complementary in the household utility production.
Estimated elasticity of substitution in a life cycle model of labor supply and retirement
with nested CES utility function suggests almost perfect substitutability between the
leisure of husband and wife in purely technological sense. This result is robust to alterna-
tive model specifications, and invites further investigation into the sources of retirement
coordination. None of the earlier papers that address coordinated retirement adheres to
a strict definition of the elasticity of substitution. Rather, complementarity is inferred
either from the response to the financial or policy incentives to the retirement of a spouse
(Banks et al., 2007; Coile, 2004) or from dependency of effective individual leisure on the
leisure consumed by the spouse (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004; Casanova, 2010).
I explore alternative channels of retirement coordination using a dynamic program-
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 ming model of optimal labor supply and retirement behavior of older married couples.
The model accounts for uncertainty about household structure, survival, health condi-
tions, and wage earnings. It allows to identify four distinct reasons for synchronized
retirement in a household. First, coordination may result from the shocks received by
individual household members that eventually affect the wellbeing of the couple, such as
health shocks. Both spouses may respond to these shocks in a way that results in coordi-
nated labor market behavior. For example, a negative shock to the health of one spouse
may generate simultaneous retirement as one spouse would find it more difficult to work
while the other would switch from work to delivering more home care. Second, household
structure, for example the presence of young children, may affect the weight on leisure
relative to consumption. Third, coordination can appear as a consequence of positive
sorting in the marriage market or development of similar tastes for leisure over the years
of shared life. The general argument supporting this proposition is that individuals who
get matched have close tastes for work. For this reason, later in life they tend to make
similar decisions on the preferred mode of retirement, in particular choosing between
longer or shorter working lives. This source of coordination in the model is captured by
the household fixed effects. Finally, coordination may be due to the government tax or
Social Security policies, such as a possibility to claim spousal retirement benefits.
The model is calibrated to the data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). It
predicts quite accurately the labor supply decisions made by the HRS households in the
sample. Using a set of counterfactuals, I show that while all suggested channels matter
for retirement coordination to some extent, almost half of coordinated retirements can
be traced to the unobserved heterogeneity of the household preferences for leisure over
consumption. While retirement coordination reduces when the Social Security provisions
regulating joint family benefits are eliminated, the impact is only around 6%. It appears
that in this case household members are less likely to opt for early retirement, and the
probability distribution of the timing chosen to apply for benefits gets closer to the sample
distribution of the age differences of the spouses. This is to some extent unexpected as
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 many other studies have found that retirement behavior is heavily influenced by policy
incentives and institutional environment (Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blau, 2009).
The rest of the paper contains six sections. The next section documents the presence
of retirement coordination in the data. Section three explains the model. I propose
and implement an empirical test of leisure complementarity in section four. Section five
introduces alternative channels of retirement coordination and presents parametrization
of the structural model. Section six describes the model predictions and counterfactuals,
and the final section concludes.
2 Evidence of retirement coordination
The first papers that have documented the prevalence of joint retirement were based on
the data from the period between 1960 and 1990 (Blau, 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier,
2000; Hurd, 1990). In this section, I verify that in spite of the major changes in female
attachment to the labor force over the life cycle, retirement coordination is still present
in contemporary data.
I use the data from seven most recent core waves of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS, 2002-2014).1 The HRS is a nationally representative longitudinal study of the US
population over the age of 50. The data are collected biennially since 1992 and cover a
broad range of subjects, including employment, earnings and wealth, family structure,
participation in the government programs, health and mortality. Earlier survey waves
were excluded for several reasons. First, the HRS is only representative of the entire older
population of the US rather than of specific cohorts after 1998. Second, consumption data
that are essential for estimation of the household preferences have not been collected until
2001. Finally, a change of Social Security earnings test that took place in 2000 created
an important discontinuity in policy environment that is beyond the scope of this paper.
The estimation sample includes non-institutionalized, two-member married or part-
1The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant
number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan.
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 nered households. New marriages and partnerships formed over the period of observation
and same sex couples are excluded from the sample. In addition to missing data, the sam-
ple is further restricted to families in which age difference between the spouses does not
exceed fifteen years. Each household member in the sample is required to have at least
five years of job market experience over the lifetime, removing single career households
where retirement is virtually an individual rather than joint decision. Finally, the sample
only includes households with income above the US Census Bureau poverty thresholds.
The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel with 33,886 household-year observations on
8,175 unique couples. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables of the
model.
In order to avoid ambiguity of subjective definitions that invoke the notion of retire-
ment, I define retirement using the labor force status. Any worker who is not in the
labor force is considered retired. A quick inspection of the data shows that the spouses
share the same retirement status in 70% of available observations, split almost evenly
between the cases in which both work (47%) and both are retired (53%). Similarly, the
difference in the partners’ weekly hours of labor supply is less than five hours for 47% of
couple-year observations. Figure 1 plots an estimated kernel density of the differences be-
tween the calendar months of the spouses’ retirements in households with both members
out of labor force by 2014. The distribution is centered around zero with a clear peak
at smaller differences between the months of labor force exit, pointing at the presence
of joint retirement in the data. Numerically, the spouses that have left the labor force
within the same year accounted for 22% of retired couples in 2014, and 7% of retirements
have happened within a month of each other. In addition, 47% of retired couples took
up Social Security in the same calendar year. In terms of subjective expectations, 56% of
the working respondents of both genders responded positively when asked whether they
plan to retire together with the spouse in the first wave of the HRS.
While these data facts suggest the prevalence of joint and coordinated retirement,
one plausible explanation is that they merely reflect the distribution of age differences
4
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 within the households. After all, we are looking at a sample of older workers, and it
might not be too surprising that people of roughly similar age retire around the same
time. To explore this possibility, I estimate a reduced form linear probability model in
which the labor force status of each worker depends on the labor force status of a part-
ner, couple’s age difference, and individual demographic characteristics (age quadratic,
education, experience and health).
Table 2 shows several sets of estimates of this reduced from relationship. The main
estimates in columns (1)-(2) are maximum likelihood estimates of two simultaneous re-
tirement equations, in which retirement status of the two partners is determined jointly.
For comparison, columns (3)-(4) contain estimates of a baseline model in which individual
retirement decision is independent of the partner’s labor force status. Models in columns
(5)-(6) estimate the likelihood of retirement treating the labor force status of a spouse as
exogenous.
The main result is that retirement status of the spouse is a statistically significant
predictor of the retirement probability even after controlling for age differences and other
variables in the model. At age 65, the effect of partner’s retirement in the simultaneous
equations model is equivalent to 1.5 additional years of age for males, and 3.25 years for
females. As expected, it is less than in the model with exogenously determined retirement
of a partner. The latter is expected to have an upwards bias due to endogeneity arising
from the joint nature of the household retirement decision.
The effect of age difference is much smaller than that of the spouse’s labor force
status: for a 65 year old worker it amounts to only an equivalent of two months of age.
The estimates of other parameters do not seem to be sensitive to the inclusion of partner’s
retirement status. These results are robust and hold in various specifications, suggesting
that observed joint retirements are driven by forces different from the distribution of
couples’ ages alone.
Having documented that the cases of joint retirement when the spouses leave the labor
force at roughly the same time are still quite common, and realizing that this coordination
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 can not be entirely attributed to the distribution of age differences, I now turn to other
possible explanations of retirement coordination. In the next section, I develop a test of
the proposition that couples coordinate retirement because of leisure complementarity.
3 A life-cycle model of household labor supply
A dynamic model of household labor supply set up in this section builds upon MaCurdy
(1985). To analyze the role of leisure complementarity in the household retirement de-
cision, I extend the model to include two decision makers whose joint preferences are
described by a nested CES utility function. The unit of analysis is a married household
consisting of two members: husband and wife, indexed by s = {h,w}. A household
lives for T periods, and in each period t ∈ {0, . . . , T} it maximizes a joint utility from
shared consumption, Ct, and leisure of the two household members, Lst . The price of
consumption good is normalized to one in all periods, and wages of the spouses, W st , are
determined exogenously. The household utility function U(·) is assumed to be increasing,
concave, and three times continuously differentiable. Preferences are additive over time
and separable across the states of nature. Consumption and leisure are normal goods,
and the capital markets are perfect.
A household has two sources of income. The first is labor income determined by wage
rates and the amount of labor that each individual supplies out of a fixed endowment L¯.
The second is Social Security retirement income received by eligible household members,
Sst . Households may save and invest a joint stock of assets At at a constant interest rate
r. Future wages, survival and health conditions are uncertain. A household forms beliefs
over the distribution of their values; these beliefs and discounting factor β are assumed
to be identical across the household members. In each period of life t, the household
updates its expectations with new information and maximizes the expected discounted
6
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 utility over the remaining lifetime,
maxUt = E t
T∑
j=t
βj−tU(Cj, Lhj , Lwj ),
subject to exogenous processes for survival, household structure, health and wage deter-
mination, a set of budget constraints
At+1 = (1 + r)
At − Ct + ∑
s=h,w
(
(L¯− Lst)W st + Sst
) (1)
and a terminal condition AT+1 = 0.
The single period utility function is assumed to take nested CES form, relaxing a
frequently used assumption of intratemporal separability between the leisure goods and
consumption. In this setting, the marginal utility of leisure for each spouse depends both
on own labor supply and on the labor supply of a spouse. The inner nest of the household
utility contains the CES leisure subaggregate
Lt =
[
αL(Lht )ρL + (1− αL)(Lwt )ρL
]1/ρL
.
The key parameter of interest that allows to examine substitutability of leisure in the
household is ρL ∈ (−∞, 1), which is related to the elasticity of substitution between the
leisure of husband and wife, σL, as σL =
1
1− ρL . The limiting values of ρL yield the cases
of perfect substitutability of leisure (ρL = 1), perfect complementarily (ρL = −∞), and
Cobb-Douglas preferences when relative demands for goods are independent of relative
prices (ρL = 0). Beyond the limiting values, the leisure of husband is a gross complement
to the leisure of wife for values ρL < 0 that correspond to 0 < σL < 1. In this case, as
the relative price of husband’s leisure increases, the relative amount of labor supplied by
husband would increase as well, but proportionately less than the rise of relative price.
The opposite happens for values 0 < ρL < 1. Because in this case σL > 1, an increase in
the husband’s relative labor supply is proportionately larger than an increase in relative
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 price, and the leisures of the household members are gross substitutes.
Parameter αL ∈ [0, 1] is the weight on husband’s leisure that determines the relative
contribution made by leisure consumption of each partner to the household utility. While
the elasticity of substitution parameter ρL shows how the relative demand for goods
responds to changes in relative prices, the weights determine the productivity of leisure
contribution. For example, if one of the spouses has higher home productivity, his or her
leisure time may deliver more to the household utility, and receive a higher weight in the
aggregate function.
The outer nest of the CES utility joins the leisure subaggregate and consumption as
U(Ct, Lht , Lwt ) = [αL
ρ
t + (1− α)Cρt ]1/ρ , (2)
where ρ characterizes the elasticity of substitution between household consumption and
leisure, and α is the weight placed on leisure subaggregate.
I exploit the algebra of the CES preferences to estimate parameters of the household
utility function as in Heckman et al. (1998). The first order optimality conditions for
individual leisure choices are
ΛtαLρ−1t αL(Lht )ρL−1 = λtW ht (3)
and
ΛtαLρ−1t (1− αL)(Lwt )ρL−1 = λtWwt , (4)
where Λt = [αLρt + (1− α)Cρt ](1−ρ)/ρ and λt is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the
budget constraint. The log ratio of the first order conditions (3) and (4) yields
log W
h
t
Wwt
= log αL1− αL + (ρL − 1) log
Lht
Lwt
. (5)
It can be further shown that the price of the household leisure bundle Lt is computed
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 by
Wt =
[
α
1/(1−ρL)
L (W ht )ρL/(ρL−1) + (1− αL)1/(1−ρL)(Wwt )ρL/(ρL−1)
](ρL−1)/ρL
.
This result can be used to compute the log ratio of the two first order conditions for
consumption and leisure subaggregate,
logWt = log
α
1− α + (ρ− 1) log
Lt
Ct
. (6)
The fixed effects estimator consistently estimates the sample equivalent of equation
(5) with an error term ε1 that captures unexplained variation in the spouse wage gap,
log W
h
it
Wwit
= β10 + β11 log
Lhit
Lwit
+ ε1it. (7)
Similarly, the outer nest of utility function is estimated by the empirical counterpart of
equation (6),
logWit = β20 + β21 log
Lit
Cit
+ ε2it. (8)
Together, equations (7) and (8) yield an empirical specification for estimation of the
household utility function (2). Point estimates of the original parameters of interest are
computed as continuous functions of the estimates βˆ. For example, parameters of the
inner CES nest are estimated by αˆL =
exp(βˆ10)
1 + exp(βˆ10)
and ρˆL = βˆ11 + 1. A test of leisure
complementarity can be based directly on the estimate of the elasticity of substitution
parameter ρL. Equivalently, failing to reject the null hypothesis H0 : β11 < −1 would
imply that the leisure terms are gross complements in the household utility function. The
estimates of the household preferences and the outcomes of leisure complementarity test
are discussed in the next section.
9
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 4 The test of leisure complementarity
The variables in the estimating equations (7) and (8) are given the following empirical
counterparts. Male wages are instrumented by quadratic of labor market experience.
Female wages are predicted from a Heckman selection model, with exclusion restrictions
given by the number of children residing in the household, the number of grandchildren,
the number of children living within ten miles, and a health dummy. Annual leisure hours
are generated by subtracting hours of work from 8,760, the maximum number of hours
available in a calendar year.
Consumptions measure is based on the total household consumption variable from
Consumption and Activity Mail Supplement (CAMS), a regular supplement to the main
HRS administered since 2001. Because CAMS is only sent out to a random subsample
of the core HRS respondents, the sample with complete collected data is very small. To
increase the size of the sample available for estimation, missing consumption values are
imputed from a linear regression of CAMS log consumption on the variables from the
core survey, including the age of the household members, their total assets, education,
labor supply, income, and the number of household residents.
The wage gap estimated by (7) may vary with time and households. This variation
is captured by imposing an additive structure on the intercept term that identifies the
utility weight of husband’s leisure in subaggregate (2),
β10 = log
(
αL
1− αL
)
= φ1i + d1t, (9)
where φ1i and d1t are individual and time fixed effects, respectively. Similarly, the in-
tercept in (8) that identifies the utility weight on the household leisure subaggregate Lt
varies additively with household and time fixed effects, an indicator of a child living in the
household Kit, an indicator of a couple having grandchildren Git, and health conditions
10
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 of the two household members Hhit and Hwit :
β20 = log
(
α
1− α
)
= φ2i + d2t + γ1Kit + γ2Git +
∑
s=h,w
γs3H
s
it. (10)
Health conditions are measured by a health dummy variable that takes a value zero for
individuals who have one or more diagnosed medical condition, and one for individuals
without a record of severe medical problems2.
Estimated parameters of the household utility function for several model specifications
are given in Table 3. The key result is that the estimated value of parameter ρL is close
to one in all specification. This implies that the elasticity of substitution between the
leisure of husband and wife is a large positive number. For the main set of results (Model
5), its point estimate is σˆL = 196. Recall that the elasticity of substitution parameter
ρL characterizes technological substitutability between the leisure of husband and wife.
When ρL < 0, gross complementarity between leisure of the spouses generates positive
correlation of the two labor supply decisions, resulting in coordinated exit from the labor
force. The estimation results however suggest exactly the opposite: the leisure times of
the spouses are almost perfect substitutes rather than gross complements.
I show several sets of robustness checks in order to confirm that this result is consistent
across alternative specifications with additional individual and household controls. Model
1 is the baseline that does not account for the household and time fixed effects. It
yields the lowest estimated value of ρˆL = 0.861, yet even with this value the leisure
terms are clearly gross substitutes. Models 2 and 3 add the two sets of fixed effects to
Model 1. Model 4 tests if the degree of leisure substitutability depends on the household
characteristics, such as age and health. In all specifications, we see strong substitutability
between the leisure terms.
We find therefore that the co-movement of the household wages and leisure choices
in the data does not support the hypothesis of leisure complementarity, and so observed
2The list of medical conditions in the HRS includes eight diseases: high blood pressure, diabetes,
cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, psychiatric problems, and arthritis.
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 retirement coordination must be explained by another channel. In the next section I show
that even without leisure complementarity, the model can still generate retirement coor-
dination. I then explore the role of alternative mechanisms that account for retirement
coordination in this model.
5 Alternative sources of retirement coordination
Complementarity of leisure is not the only possible source of retirement coordination in
this model. Retirement coordination may also be caused by the factors that shift the
weight on the household leisure composite in the utility function. An increase in the
overall importance of leisure over consumption in the household decision making would
make each partner reduce own labor supply, and lead to synchronized retirement. For
example, the birth of grandchildren may increase the value of the household leisure, and
provide incentives for joint retirement that are not related to the technological comple-
mentarity. Similarly, a bad health shock may change the weight on the leisure composite.
The spouse who suffered the shock would find it more difficult to work, but the other
partner may also attach higher weight to the leisure to provide home care. In the model,
this channel of coordination is represented by additional determinants of the weight on
the leisure composite, α, in equation (10).
Next, retirement may be coordinated because of assortative matching in marriage.
Couples match on many factors, possibly including similar tastes for leisure. If this is
the case, we would observed coordinated retirement simply because of implicitly shared
understanding of the right time to leave the labor force. In the model, shared tastes for
leisure are included along with other time-invariant shifters of the household preferences
that are captured by the fixed effects in equations (9) and (10).
Finally, retirement coordination can arise as a response to the policy environment and
common wealth effects operating through the budget constraint. In the US context, a
policy of particular interest is an option to choose between own and a fraction of spouse’s
12
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 benefits, which creates a strong linkage of retirement incentives within a couple.
In the rest of the paper, I test whether these three channels can account for observed
retirement coordination, and quantify their relative importance. The inference is based on
a simulated dataset that contains a sequence of the lifetime labor supply, consumption
and saving decisions of 100,000 households. To create this dataset, I solve a dynamic
model from Section 3 recursively from the moment the older spouse reaches the terminal
age T = 100. The solution to the problem provides a sequence of numerically determined
optimal decision rules for household employment, consumption and the timing of the
Social Security uptake.
The model is specified as follows. The household utility function is parameterized
using the estimates of Model 5 reported in Table 3 from the previous section. The
discounting factor and the rate of return on assets are assigned the values β = 0.98 and
r = 0.03. All modeled households are guaranteed a minimum annual consumption level
of $5,000 which approximates the role of various anti-poverty programs.
The simulation framework further requires complete specification of the transition
rules for exogenous processes that describe uncertainty in the model. These include
survival, health, household structure and wage transitions. I assume that agents have
rational expectations, and that the state transition probabilities are conditionally inde-
pendent. This implies that the joint probability density of moving between two states
can be presented as a product of marginal densities for individual state variables. The
marginal densities can then be estimated independently as discussed below, their product
yielding the joint density. To complete the simulations set up, I provide a description of
the policy environment, captured by the key stylized Social Security rules. Agents believe
that the government policy is time invariant, and so are the household fixed effects. Asset
state evolves deterministically according to the budget constraint (1).
13
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 1. Survival and health transition probabilities
Before reaching the terminal age T at which an individual dies with probability one, each
household member faces an exogenous mortality risk. A household is considered alive so
long as both household members are. If one household members dies earlier, the other
inherits all accumulated assets, and the household problem is terminated with assigned
continuation value of a single-member household for the surviving spouse. Mortality and
health processes for husband and wife are assumed to be conditionally independent. In-
dividual survival and health transition probabilities are estimated by binary logit models
conditional on age and health lag. Estimated marginal effects are shown in Table 4.
2. The household structure
Transition rules for the household structure are defined by two deterministic processes.
The relevant elements of the household structure are two indicators, one for the presence
of resident children and the other for having grandchildren. Any young children currently
living with their parents are assumed to stay in the household until they turn 18. No new
children are born over the modeling period. Grandchildren are born at deterministic age
that is predicted from a log-normal survival model conditional on the number of grown
up children and the lifetime income of the household.
3. Wage transition probabilities
Unobserved wages for nonworking individuals are predicted from a selection model con-
ditional on education, work experience, time and regional dummies. The individual wage
transitions are then modeled as two conditionally independent error components processes
14
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 with AR(1) disturbances:
logWt = W (t) + ζwt (11)
ζwt = ρwζwt−1 + εwt ,
εwt ∼ N(0, σ2εw),
where ζwt is persistent AR(1) component of wage process with autocorrelation ρw, and
εwt is white noise. Conditional mean of the wage W (t) depends on age and health.
The estimates are reported in the last two columns of Table 4. In the simulations, the
autoregressive component is discretized into three nodes discrete Markov chain using
Rouwenhorst method (Rouwenhorst, 1995).
4. Social Security
The Social Security benefits enter the model as a component of the household income
in the budget constraint (1). In general, the amount of benefits received by a qualified
household depends on a number of factors, including individual earnings histories, the
choice of take up age, and employment decisions after retirement. In the model, the
amount of Social Security benefits is computed deterministically based on the household
earnings history, the choice of time for benefits application and the parameters of the
Social Security system.
To account for the main work and retirement incentives provided by the US Social
Security retirement program, the model incorporates the following stylized facts repre-
senting the key features of the present system.
1. Eligibility. The earliest age at which a worker may apply for Social Security re-
tirement benefits is 62. After applying, an individual receives a stream of benefits
until death. All workers in the model are qualified to receive benefits. I require
that everybody takes up the Social Security benefits by the age 70 at the latest, as
the system provides no incentives in terms of benefit increases or penalties related
15
                            17 / 31
 to employment after this age.
2. Primary insurance amount (PIA) and average indexed monthly earnings (AIME).
PIA is the starting point in the calculation of payable Social Security benefits. It
is a function of the lifetime earnings that are measured by AIME, an average of
individual’s highest earnings taken over up to 35 years. Annual earnings counted
towards AIME are adjusted using the national wage index to reflect the real wage
growth in the economy. In the simulations, initial value of the AIME is computed
from the restricted part of the HRS Social Security data and is drawn for each
simulated individual as a part of the initial state.
PIA is regressive in the AIME, favoring workers with lower lifetime earnings. It is
linked to the AIME by a piecewise linear function using the formula
PIA =

0.9× AIME if AIME < B1
0.9×B1 + 0.32× (AIME−B1) if B1 ≤ AIME < B2
0.9×B1 + 0.32×B2 + 0.15× (AIME−B2) if AIME ≥ B2,
(12)
where B1 and B2 are the two AIME bend points fixed by law depending on the
year in which recipient attains age 62. The bend points used in the simulations
correspond to 2000, the starting year of the simulations (B1 = $531 and B2 =
$3, 202).
3. Early and delayed retirement. The PIA gives the amount of benefit an individual
would get if she were to begin receiving it at normal retirement age. A worker who
started receiving benefits before the normal retirement age will get less than the
PIA, and a worker who postponed application beyond the normal retirement age
will get more. The normal retirement age varies in the range between 65 and 67 by
year of birth. In the simulations, it is set equal to 66. PIA adjustments for early
and delayed retirement are simplified as follows. Benefits are reduced by 6.7% of
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 the PIA for each year of starting before the normal retirement age. One year of
delayed retirement up to the age 70 increases the benefits by 8%.
4. Spouse’s benefits. Spouses age 62 and older of workers who are getting Social
Security retirement benefits are eligible to receive spouse’s benefits. The maximum
amount of spouse’s benefit is 50% of the worker’s PIA. If a spouse begins receiving
the benefits before the normal retirement age, their amount is reduced by 8.3% for
each year of early retirement. Spouses younger than the normal retirement age who
are eligible for both their own and spousal benefits would receive their own benefit
first, and supplement it with the spousal benefit up to a maximum limit of 50%
of the worker’s PIA. Spouses who already reached the normal retirement age may
claim spousal benefits first and continue to earn credit for delayed retirement on
their own benefits, switching later to a higher amount. Simulated households choose
a combination of individual benefits that delivers the highest expected present value
of the future payments.
5. Minimum and maximum benefits. The minimum PIA provides adequate benefits
to long-term low earners. Its value depends on the number of years of coverage and
the year in which the benefits start. In the model the minimum PIA is set to $600,
corresponding to the value for an individual with 30 years of coverage in year 2000.
The total amount received by a family in worker and spousal benefits is capped
using a piecewise formula with three bend points M1, M2 and M3,
Smax =

1.5× PIA if PIA < M1
1.5×M1 + 2.72× (PIA−M1) if M1 ≤ PIA < M2
1.5×M1 + 2.72×M2 + 1.34× (PIA−M2) if M2 ≤ PIA < M3
1.5×M1 + 2.72×M2 + 1.34×M3 + 1.75× (PIA−M3) if PIA ≥M3.
(13)
The 2000 values used in the simulations are M1 = $679, M2 = $980 and M3 =
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 $1, 278.
This completes the model description, and allows to proceed with the simulations. I
draw the initial joint distribution of ages, assets, wage rates, AIME, health conditions
and household composition from Wave 6 of the HRS dataset using individual sampling
weights. The household’s annual transitions between the points of the state space are
governed by random shocks to wages, health and survival. In each state, a household
selects consumption and labor supply so that to maximize the expected lifetime utility,
thus generating a simulated path. The moments from the resulting dataset can then
be compared to the observed moments in order to evaluate the goodness of fit, and
counterfactual paths can be generated under alternative combinations of policy conditions
and realized shocks.
6 Model fit and counterfactuals
Figure 2 compares simulated male and female retirement rates by age to the data. The
model captures the general retirement trend, with an overall absolute deviation between
observed and simulated retirement rates of 0.09 for males and 0.08 for females. The
average time between retirement of husband and wife is 2.04 months in the simulations,
and 2.6 months in the data. In terms of coordination, 38% of the couples in the main
simulations have retired within the same year.
Having calibrated the model, I can now show how shutting down each of the potential
coordination channels affects the fraction of coordinated retirements in the simulations.
I run a set of counterfactuals in which the households are identical to those in the bench-
mark simulation in terms of all initial state characteristics and stochastic shocks received
throughout the lifetime, except for selected features or policy incentives that may poten-
tially account for synchronized retirement.
I start with the household structure, and eliminate incentives to retirement coordi-
nation that come from having dependent children or grandchildren. This leads to two
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 counterfactuals. In the first counterfactual, I eliminate any dependent children at the
onset of the simulations. In the absence of young children, the weight placed on the
household leisure is on average higher. In the second counterfactual I eliminate the pos-
sibility of grandchild birth, which has an opposite effect on the household leisure weight
to that of own children. Both changes do affect the degree of retirement coordination in
the simulations, albeit the effect is modest in magnitude. In the absence of children and
grandchildren, the fraction of coordinated retirements in the simulated data decreases re-
spectively by 4.3 and 3.6%. The total impact of the household composition on retirement
coordination when both children and grandchildren are excluded from the model comes
up to 7%.
Next, I evaluate the impact of Social Security policy on the household decision making
by eliminating the rules that link the benefits of the spouses. I assume that there is no
option to qualify for benefits that are based on a fraction of the spouse’s PIA, so that
each individual is only eligible for own retirement benefits. There are also no rules that
restrict the maximum amount of benefits available to a household. This counterfactual
with modified policy environment yields a 5.7% reduction of coordinated retirement cases,
an impact comparable to that of the household structure. It also predicts that both
males and females would retire later by approximately five months relative to the baseline
simulations, suggesting that in the absence of interlinked benefits each household member
is more likely to retire closer to own full retirement age.
The effect of health shocks on the household retirement decision is much stronger
than either the household structure or the Social Security rules. I assume that the
entire sample is healthy in the initial state. The households keep on anticipating the
possibility of negative shocks to the health of individual members and factor them into
their expectations when making labor supply and retirement decisions, however the actual
event never arrives and they stay healthy at least until the age seventy. In this setting,
the number of coordinated retirements falls by one quarter. This result reflects the role
that health plays as an incentive to individual retirement. It is largely due to the overall
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 delay of retirement from the labor force, which now happens almost two years later than
in the benchmark scenario.
The last channel of retirement coordination that I test is represented by the house-
hold fixed effects that capture unobservable heterogeneity in the household preference for
leisure and the relative weights on the individual leisure terms in the household utility
function. I eliminate this source of household heterogeneity by setting the fixed effect
terms in both inner and outer nests of the household utility function to their estimated
mean values. The resulting impact on retirement coordination is higher than in any
of the previously discussed cases. It amounts to 40% of coordination cases when both
sources are eliminated, with almost two thirds of the effect attributable to the fixed ef-
fects of the outer nest that determine the relative weight on the household consumption
and composite leisure term. In terms of impact, this source of retirement coordination
is on a level similar to coordination due to the distribution of age differences. To out-
line this comparison, I implement an additional counterfactual in which the age of both
household members is set to the mean age of the couple, and all remaining characteristics
and shocks remain unchanged. Because there are no longer any age differences in the
couples, retirement coordination in this simulation increases by almost 50%. In absolute
values this comes close to the effect of heterogeneity of the household preferences, which
has been identified as the most important mechanism of retirement coordination in the
model.
7 Conclusions
This paper uses the data from the Health and Retirement Study to test whether comple-
mentarity of leisure in dual career households can explain coordinated retirement from
the labor force. I develop a test of leisure complementarity that is based on a dynamic
model of household labor supply with flexible CES preferences. My estimates show that
the leisure of the spouses in the household utility function are strong substitutes rather
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 than complements. This finding appears very robust and holds for a range of model
specifications with different choice of controls.
The result is important because leisure complementarity is often referenced in the
retirement literature as a routine explanation of retirement coordination. The degree
of technological substitutability between the leisure of husbands and wives is important
for policy makers, as the joint household response to policy measures will depend on
the interaction of leisure and consumption terms in the household utility function. For
example, if the leisure terms were complementary, we could expect a magnified response
to the gender specific policies. This will not be the case for substitutable leisure terms.
Having shown that the leisure complementarity can not generate observed retirement
coordination, I turn to other possible explanations that are nested within the model.
Using estimated parameters of the household utility function, I calibrate a dynamic pro-
gramming model that accounts for uncertainty about household survival and structure,
health conditions, and wage earnings. I further use a set of counterfactuals to evaluate
the role that the household structure, health shocks, Social Security policy and unob-
served household heterogeneity each play in retirement coordination. I show that while
each of these channels is accountable for some of the observed synchronized retirements,
the most important source of retirement coordination is heterogeneity in the weights that
the household place on consumption relative to the leisure aggregate.
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 Figures and tables
Figure 1: The distribution of differences in retirement dates of the spouses
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Notes: Couples with both spouses retired as of 2014. Kernel density estimate (Epanechnekov kernel).
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 Figure 2: Labor force participation: comparison of data and simulations
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Best fit = 0.1786, output from May 3 2017 (alternative 0.10 with TimeEnd = 10K)
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Males Females
Variable Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
Age, years 64.6 63.0 9.1 63.7 62.0 8.4
Black, % 6.4 5.6
Hispanic, % 5.3 5.3
Schooling, years 13.6 14.0 2.8 13.4 13.0 2.5
No chronic health conditions, % 19.2 18.8
Employed, % 56.1 47.9
Employed full-time, % 43.4 29.7
Annual hours of work 2,034 2,080 826 1,687 1,920 768
Hourly wage 25.6 18.6 26.4 16.7 13.0 11.9
Average annual earnings 57,512 43,236 63,131 32,598 25,497 26,661
Years worked 39.9 41.0 10.6 30.7 32.0 11.9
Receive Social Security, % 45.3 42.9
Social Security income 14,411 14,292 6,174 9,290 8,124 5,423
Household
Mean Median S.D.
Total income 77,290 57,746 65,174
Housing & financial wealth 456,499 247,553 598,962
Consumption 56,102 48,453 34,862
Number of residents 2.5 2.0 1.0
Resident child, % 28.3
Have grandchildren, % 74.9
Number of household observations 33,886
Number of unique couples in the sample 8,175
Notes: Pooled statistics for the 2002-2014 estimation sample, weighted using the HRS individual and
household weights. All monetary values are given in 2000 dollars.
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 Table 2: Reduced form relationship between retirement decisions of the spouses
Simultaneous Independent retirement equations
retirement Independent Interdependent
equations retirement decisions retirement decisions
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age, years 0.103 0.080 0.108 0.087 0.096 0.077
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age squared (×0.01) -0.051 -0.040 -0.054 -0.044 -0.048 -0.039
(-0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Good health -0.141 -0.127 -0.142 -0.129 -0.140 -0.125
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Education, years -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Experience, years -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age difference -0.005 0.006 -0.007 0.008 -0.003 0.004
of the couple (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Spouse retired 0.063 0.104 - - 0.158 0.161
(0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009)
F-statistic - 846 871 881 899
Log pseudolikelihood -558,762 - - - -
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of the individual labor force status (1 = out of labor
force). Figures in parentheses are standard errors clustered by household. Age difference is computed as
the difference between husband’s and wife’s ages in years. All specifications include year fixed effects.
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 Table 3: Estimates of household utility function parameters
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Substitution between leisure of 0.8614 0.9538 0.9949 0.99551 0.9949
husband and wife, ρL (0.0202) (0.0085) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0021)
Weight on husband’s leisure, αL 0.5191 0.51911 0.51951 0.51941 0.51951
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Substitution between leisure 0.8996 0.9972 0.9989 0.9989 0.9994
and consumption, ρ (0.0041) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Weight on household leisure, α 0.7690 0.75471 0.75461 0.75451 0.75441
(0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0009)
Husband’s age (log) - - - - 0.2843
(0.0464)
Wife’s age (log) - - - - 0.1669
(0.0828)
Husband in good health - - - - -0.0026
(0.0012)
Wife in good health - - - - -0.0046
(0.0014)
Resident child - - - - -0.0024
(0.0009)
Grandchildren - - - - 0.0040
(0.0017)
Household fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls in ρL No No No Yes No
Notes: Least squares estimates of the nested CES utility function, estimated in two steps by equations
(7) and (8). Standard errors in parentheses are computed using 1000 bootstrap replications. 1 - reported
coefficient is a sample average of the estimated effects.
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 Table 4: Transition probabilities for household survival, health and wage rates
Survival Health Wages
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Age×0.01 -0.035 -0.019 -0.397 -0.329 0.466 -0.319
(0.009) (0.006) (0.095) (0.092) (0.027)) (0.063)
Good health, lag 0.010 0.004
(0.001) (0.000)
Good health 0.014 0.043
(0.003) (0.007)
Autocorrelation of 0.900 0.997
AR(1) disturbances (0.007) (0.002)
Innovation variance 0.008 0.038
AR(1) disturbances (0.000) (0.001)
Wald χ-sq 116 53.7 17.1 12.7 17,595 602,992
Notes: Reported values are logit elasticities for biennial transitions computed at mean values of ex-
planatory variables. Health results are transitions from good to bad health only. Because bad health is
characterized by acquired chronic condition, recovery is assumed impossible. The number of recoveries
in the data is negligible, so that recovery model can not be estimated. Standard errors clustered by
household are given in the parentheses. Wage results are conditional maximum likelihood estimates of
equation (11).
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